Work Arrangements and Voice Effects: Employee Voice and its Impact on the Individual and the Organization – WAVE

The project is organised into four complementary Work Packages (WP). The first utilises the REPONSE/MARS surveys and the FICUS/FARE databases to analyse the effects of trade union membership and social dialogue on the performance of French organisations. The second examines the interactions between different forms of employee voice within organisations, in particular the relationship between so-called ‘participatory’ human resources practices and the various forms of staff representation (whether elected or appointed by trade unions). The third WP combines qualitative and quantitative data (case studies, international comparisons) to understand the internal and external mechanisms shaping employee voice. The fourth utilises governance databases (Boardex, FactSet) as well as a meta-analysis to study the effect of the presence of employee representatives on company boards of directors on their economic and financial performance. This combination of quantitative (panel data analysis, meta-analysis) and qualitative methods enables a cross-analysis across different levels, from the individual to the organisation.

Three empirical findings at this stage of the programme. (1) Our research shows that the presence of employees on a company’s board of directors does not robustly improve productivity or profitability, but does increase market capitalisation in financially disciplined firms (Laroche & Manseri, 2025); (2) Using the REPONSE/FEAS data, two patterns of employee share ownership have been identified: when concentrated, it follows a shareholder-oriented logic (less training, fewer pay rises, fewer strikes); when dispersed, it follows a partnership-oriented logic (stable employment, training, trade unions viewed more favourably) (Salesina et al., 2024). (3) In a fixed-effects panel analysis, unionisation reduces profitability, with this effect increasing where multiple unions are present (a rising wage premium not offset by productivity); standard estimates using pooled OLS would overestimate this effect by a factor of 3 (Dugardin, 2025). These three findings point to the same conclusion: employee voice, whether through governance, share ownership or trade union action, does not have a uniform effect on firm performance, but rather conditional effects, which depend on the specific form that this ‘voice’ takes and on the organisational and financial context in which it is exercised.

References:

Ashwin, S., Gomez, R., & Laroche, P. (2026) David Marsden’s Comparative and Theoretical Craft: Signposts to a Better World of Work. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 64(1), 91–100. doi.org/10.1111/bjir.70014

Dugardin, F. A. (2024). Labor Unions and Firms Performance: A Panel Analysis. Available at SSRN 4702115.

Mitchell, J., Sigurjonsson, T.O., Kavadis, N., Alavi, A.R. and Wendt, S., 2025. Information Asymmetries in the Green and Sustainable Bond Market: The Role of Second-Party Opinion (SPO) Providers: Journal of Management and Governance, 1-32.

Salesina, M. (2025). Marsden as organization theorist. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 64(1), 52–70. doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12828

Salesina, M., Schmitt, V., & Stévenot, A. (2024). Employee share ownership and human resource management: between shareholder and partnership approaches to governance. Finance Contrôle Stratégie, 27(NS 16). doi.org/10.4000/12nil

On the trade union front (WP1), Dugardin’s finding – that this decline in profitability increases with the number of trade unions present in the company – naturally calls for a more detailed analysis: is this effect driven equally by all trade union organisations, or do certain configurations have a greater impact than others? One might also seek to determine whether the decline in profitability stems from a slowdown in investment rather than solely from wage premiums, a question which the same FICUS/FARE data would help to resolve. An international comparison would also help to determine whether this result stems from the uniquely French system of multi-unionism or whether it is found in different bargaining systems, such as the German single-union model or the British system of recognition by ballot.

With regard to participatory HR practices (WP2), the most thought-provoking question is undoubtedly that of their relationship to trade union action: do they compete with it, as part of a managerial strategy to circumvent it, or, on the contrary, do they reinforce it? This is a direct extension of our work with Marc Salesina on multi-unionism. We could also broaden our focus beyond productivity alone to include innovation, and examine how these practices either mitigate or, conversely, exacerbate the tensions associated with the digital transformation of work, in line with our recent opinion piece on AI and trade unions.

WP3 remains, at this stage, the least advanced, and two approaches could help to flesh it out: qualitative case studies of companies combining several forms of ‘voice’ simultaneously, to gain an on-the-ground understanding of the complementary dynamics that our quantitative results merely hint at; and an exploration of artificial intelligence as a new external channel shaping employees’ expression – a field that remains largely unexplored and is consistent with our expertise.

On governance and employee share ownership (WP4), the study by Anne Stevenot and her co-authors is currently based solely on the 2017 REPONSE wave; the 2023–2024 wave would enable a shift to a panel design and allow us to observe the effects of the PACTE Act by comparing the situation before and after its entry into force. A more qualitative question also warrants consideration: what does an employee shareholder representative actually do on the board of directors? An analysis of board minutes would help to ascertain whether their presence translates into real influence over decisions or remains largely symbolic. Finally, we could cross-reference our archive data with a direct survey of employees regarding their sense of having a voice – whether through share ownership, the trade union or the board – and how this relates to their well-being at work.

The functioning and impact of different institutional structures and processes of collective voice on firm performance has gained both political and academic interest in recent years. This increase in interest was triggered by the economic crisis of 2008–9, when the ability of some types and structures of collective bargaining to provide flexibility for companies to maintain competitiveness began to be questioned in some countries. Moreover, in a time of high and rising inequality, voice systems that reduce inequality have a greater value than they would in a time of low or falling inequality. Unions, for example, invariably trade off some economic efficiency for the sake of greater justice in the workplace. The proposed research project is a ground-breaking innovative analysis of the mechanism through which employee voice affect firm competitiveness. Going beyond state-of-the-art studies on the economic effects of unions, our analysis of labour relations expands the analysis of employee voice beyond the unions/collective bargaining versus non-union management decision-making dichotomy to examine the changing work arrangements and channels through which workers seek to affect workplace outcomes.