CE26 - Innovation, Travail

Political Behaviors and Electoral Accountability – POLIT-ECON

Political behaviors and accoutability

Pluridisciplinary research project on the behaviors, strategies and motivations of French parliamentarians in the era of open data and accountability from civil society

Issues and objectives of the project

This project of french parliamentarians is embedded in a context of evolutions affecting the functionning and composition of the Parliament : we can notably cite the easier access to open data about legislators' activity, the increasing role of watchdog of the civil society, and the new obligations of transparency of elected officials' interests.<br />The project analyzes these evolutions and the way they reveal the strategies and motivations underlying the behaviors of French parliamentarians.

The project is conducted by a team of researchers in economics, political science and law who specialize in legislative studies of the French Parliament. The approaches are both theoretical and empirical and rely on qualitative methods, theoretical modelling and econometrics.

Most research questions are still under study.

The project is still underway, and reseach perspectives will mature in the coming months.

1. François, A., & Navarro, J. (2019). Voters reward hard-working MPs: Empirical evidence from the French legislative elections. European Political Science Review, 11(4).
www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/voters-reward-hardworking-mps-empirical-evidence-from-the-french-legislative-elections/0547F534A5355A42DE4FA5EE83E929AB
2. François, A., & Navarro, J. (2020). Voters reward hard-working MPs: Empirical evidence from the French legislative elections. Swiss Political Science Review, 26(1).
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/spsr.12390
3. François, A. & Phelippeau, E. (2018). Paraitre transparent ? Les usages des déclarations d’intérêt par les maires des grandes villes françaises, Revue Française d’Administration Publique, 2018/1(165). www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-d-administration-publique-2018-1-page-79.htm
4. Kerléo, J-F. (2020). La déclaration d’intérêts en a-t-elle un ? Jus Politicum blog.juspoliticum.com/2020/02/28/la-declaration-dinterets-en-a-t-elle-un-par-jean-francois-kerleo/

In recent years in France, a sequence of political scandals has eroded the public trust in political elites. Today, 89% of voters think that politicians pay little to no attention to their opinions and 77% view parliamentarians as corrupt. As a response, new legislation and institutions were enforced in the last years to set stricter rules of conduct for elected officials, prevent conflicts of interests and corrupt behavior, and ensure data transparency. However, it remains uncertain whether such innovations have the potential to effectively re-align politicians' behaviors with voters' expectations. This research project seeks to shed light on these issues from a multidisciplinary perspective, first by documenting the behaviors and underlying motivations of elected officials (public service spirit, rent-extraction), and second by investigating how new rules, new controls, and better-informed citizens can make
politicians accountable.

Project coordination

Benjamin MONNERY (EconomiX)

The author of this summary is the project coordinator, who is responsible for the content of this summary. The ANR declines any responsibility as for its contents.

Partner

EconomiX

Help of the ANR 101,822 euros
Beginning and duration of the scientific project: December 2018 - 36 Months

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